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Soft Law and Institutional Practice 
in the European Community
Fr a n c is  S n y d e r *
Introduction
Law in context is widely recognised as a distinctive approach to legal studies. 
Only recently, however, has it been applied to European Community law.1 
This article aims to contribute to the development of the contextual approach.
In order to situate the article in relation to other studies of European 
Community law, let us draw a heuristic distinction between different ways of 
looking at law, legal institutions and legal processes. The perspective of the 
lawyer in practice, either private or public, is concerned primarily with 
finding solutions to specific legal issues, which arise in particular cases and 
are brought to the lawyer by clients. The perspective of the policy-maker 
considers law mainly as an instrument, and asks whether and how it con­
tributes to or hinders the achievement of policy objectives. The doctrinal per­
spective on law aims mainly to analyse, systematise and give a exposition of 
legal norms, demonstrating their coherence and, if necessary, criticising their
* Professor of European Community Law, European University Institute, Florence; 
Professor of Law, College of Europe, Bruges; Honorary Visiting Professor of Law, 
University College London. The author thanks Jason Coppel, Renaud Dehousse, 
Christian Joerges, Giandomenico Majone and Stephen Weatherill for their contributions 
to this article. He alone of course is responsible for its contents.
* See Francis Snyder, New Directions in European Community Law (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1990); Francis Snyder European Community Law, 2 volumes (Aldershot: 




























































































contradictions. The perspective of law in context may be summarised for our 
purposes as follows: either law is viewed from the standpoint of other disci­
plines, using their theories and modes of analysis; or law provides the starting 
point but is situated in a broader context, whether social, economic, political 
or cultural: both strands aim ultimately to contribute to a social theory of 
law.
This article gives an example of a contextual approach; it also touches on 
questions of legal policy. It considers some aspects of Commission soft law 
and institutional practice in the European Community. By 'soft law', I mean 
'rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which 
nevertheless may have practical effects'.2 The principal purposes of the dis­
cussion are two-fold. First, on the basis of the example of soft law, the article 
seeks to illuminate inter-institutional relations in the European Community, in 
particular the relations between the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice. Second, it examines some of the implications of the increasing use of 
soft law for the institutional structure of the European Community as a 
whole.
2 Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools 




























































































Towards 'Regulation By Publication'?3
Soft law has long been employed in the Community system.3 The most cele­
brated example is perhaps the Commission’s Communication4 on the conse­
quences of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Cassis de Dijon.5 Then a 
new type of quasi-legal act, it signaled the adoption by the Commission of a 
new strategy for completing the internal market. The judgment by the Court 
of Justice established the principle of 'mutual recognition'. The efforts of the 
Commission were henceforth devoted mainly to ensuring regulatory 
competition: the rigid harmonisation of national laws by means of EC 
legislation was replaced by a strategy of selective litigation by the 
Commission against Member States under Article 169 EEC. This strategy was 
consolidated, and the increasing use of soft law announced, by the 
Commission's White Paper in 1985.6
During the last decade, Community institutions have resorted to soft law with 
increasing frequency. This trend represents in part a predictable feature of 
administrative development,7 in part a comprehensible response to institu-
3 See Melchior, 'Les communications de la Commission: Contribution à l'étude des actes 
communautaires non prévus par les traités', in Mélanges Fernand Dehousse vol. 2 La 
construction européenne (Paris: Nathan; Brussels: Labor, 1979), pp. 243-258; Mattera, 
Le marché unique européen: Ses règles, son fonctionnement (Paris, Jupiter, 2nd ed. 
1990), pp 43-46; K.C. Wellens and G.M. Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community 
Law', 14, 1989, pp 267-321; Mariacristina Reale, 'Le comunicazioni inteipretative della 
Commissione della Comunità Europea', Tesi di Laurea in Diritto delle Comunità Europea, 
Università degli Studi di Bologna, Sessione invernale, 1989-1990; Mariacristina Reale, 
'Uno Strumento di "Soft Law" Comunitario', 18, Giugno 1992, pp 26-30.
4 Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission con­
cerning the Consequences of the Judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 
1877 in Case 120/78 ( ), OJ 1989 C256/2.
5 Case 120/78 v [1979] ECR 649.
6 Commission of the European Communities, 'Completing the Internal Market' (White 
Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, 28-29 June 1985), 
COM(85)310 final (1985).
7 See e.g. Jean Vergés, 'De quelques méthodes de développement institutionnel des 
Communautés européennes', in (Paris, Pedone, 1980), pp 501-517; Robert Baldwin and 
John Houghton, 'Circular Arguments: The Status and Legitimacy of Administrative 
Rules' 1986, pp 239-284; Administrative Review Council, Report to the Attorney 




























































































tional inertia, and in part a questionable attempt to circumvent or avoid the 
implications of failures to reach political agreement.8 From the standpoint of 
the Commission, for instance, soft law has several advantages. Let us take the 
example of Commission communications, since this form of soft law will be 
discussed in detail later. Communications, like legislation, may concern broad 
areas of policy, rather than treating matters in an ad hoc and piecemeal man­
ner. They are under the control of the Commission, thus in effect bypassing 
the Council. They are proactive rather than reactive, so that the Commission, 
without waiting for the Council, the European Parliament or the Court of 
Justice, can present its interpretation and stake out its position with regard to 
entire economic sectors.9
Already an important source of Community rules, Commission soft law is 
likely to have an even greater impact on the Community system in the future. 
This is so for two reasons. First, the Commission is being asked now to as­
sume administrative responsibility for managing a broader range of matters, 
often in conjunction with the Member States. Yet its means of action remain 
relatively limited and are being increasingly constricted. In debates concern­
ing the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission has frequently been criticised. Its 
right to initiate legislation, which has always been constrained, has now been 
eroded, formally as well as in practice. 10 The same could be said of its pow-
see also Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, 'An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking', 1974, 3, 1, pp 257-286.
8 Broadly similar issues have been raised with regard to the Court of Justice. See especially 
Pierre Pescatore, 'La carence du législateur et le devoir du juge', in (Saarbrücken: Europa 
Institute, 1983; Hjalte Rasmussen, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); Easson, 'Legal 
Approaches to European Integration: The Role of Court and Legislature in the Completion 
of the European Common Market', 12, 2-3, 1989, pp 101-119.
9 This paragraph draws on my contribution to the United Kingdom report in Schwarze, 
Govaere, Helin and Van de Bossche (eds.), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), p. 611.
10 See Dehousse, Joerges, Majone, Snyder in collaboration with Everson, ’Europe after 





























































































ers to implement Community legislation.!1 As a result of these and other 
factors,12 the Commission may be expected to favour soft law over hard law. 
Put colloquially, '1993 is not only the year of the Single Market, it is the year 
of the ... guidelinet.]...'15
Second, an increase in the use of Commission soft law, and Community soft 
law generally, is likely to result from the debate concerning subsidiarity as 
provided in the Maastricht Treaty. This likelihood, however, raises issues of 
fundamental importance in the Community system, especially with regard to 
relations among Community institutions. The emerging dilemmas can be il­
lustrated by focussing on what may be called 'the paradox of subsidiarity'.
The Paradox of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity was intended initially as a response to calls for 
greater openness and democracy in Community decision-making.14 As ex­
pressed in the Maastricht Treaty, and as now commonly understood, it is de­
signed in principle to allocate more decision-making power to the Member 
States.15 In practice, however, the implementation of this principle may have 
perverse unintended consequences, which though perhaps consistent with the 
letter of the principle are contrary to the spirit of the principle and its initial 
aims.
11 See especially Case 167/88 v [1989] ECR 1653; Case 22/88 v [1989] ECR 2049; Case 
16/88 v [1989] ECR 3457. See also Case C-8/88 v [1992] 1 CMLR 409; Case C-240/90 
v Judgment of 27 October 1992, not yet reported.
12 See Francis Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques', 56, 1993, pp 19-54 at 31-32.
15 Waterhouse, 'When guidelines are the limit', (Birmingham), Monday, January 4, 1993, 
p 8.
14 See e.g. Marc Wilke and Helen Wallace, RIIA Discussion Papers 27 (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1990).




























































































In October 1992 the Commission made a communication to the Council and 
the European Parliament. In its view, subsidiarity involved not only the con­
cept of subsidiarity stricto sensu, namely the question as to who should 
exercise legislative power. It also embraced the concept of proportionality, 
that is, the question as to whether and how the power should be exercised. 
This interpretation has been accepted by the European Council.16 The 
proposal by the Commission for an inter-institutional agreement with the 
Council and the European Parliament on this basis has also been accepted by 
the European Parliament and the Member States.17
Furthermore, the principle of proportionality has been interpreted by both 
Community institutions and national governments to give priority to measures 
which are not legally binding, that is, to soft law. According to the 
Commission, '[t]he main choice where subsidiarity [in the sense of propor­
tionality] is concerned is between binding and non-binding measures'.!8 '.[I]f 
action is needed to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, it must not be dispro­
portionate; this implies that recourse to the most binding instruments should 
be used as a last resort'.111 This view has been accepted by the European 
Parliament and the Member States. As expressed at the December 1992 
European Council meeting in Edinburgh:
16 See Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 
1992, Annex I to Part A, 'Overall Approach to the Application by the Council of the 
Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union'.
17 See Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 
1992, Annex I to Part A, 'Overall Approach to the Application by the Council of the 
Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union', p. 9. On the 
Commission proposal for an inter-institutional agreement, see Commission of the 
European Communities, 'The principle of subsidiarity: Communication of the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament', SEC(92)1990 final, Brussels, 
27 October 1992.
'8  Commission of the European Communities, 'The principle of subsidiarity: 
Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament', 
SEC(92)1990 final, Brussels, 27 October 1992, p. 14.
111 Commission of the European Communities, 'The principle of subsidiarity: 
Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament', 




























































































'The form of action should be as simple as possible, consistent with 
satisfactory achievement of the objective of the measure and the need 
for effective enforcement. The Community should legislate only to the 
extent necessary. Other things being equal, directives should be pre­
ferred to regulations and framework directives to detailed measures. 
Non-binding measures such as recommendations should be preferred 
where appropriate. Consideration should be given where appropriate to 
the use of voluntary codes of conduct.'20
The priority to be given to soft law thus appears to form one of the guidelines
for the application of the subsidiarity principle and Article 3b of the
Maastricht Treaty.21
The concept of subsidiarity was proposed initially as one answer to the 
European Community’s legitimacy crisis. The conjunction of these interpre­
tations gives priority, however, first to efficiency, and second perhaps to le­
gality, but to both at the expense of legitimacy. Hence the paradox of sub­
sidiarity. In its narrow formulation, the principle of subsidiarity, understood 
here in the sense of proportionality, is apparently intended to decrease the 
intensity of Community action. Yet it appears to lead in practice to the result 
that Community action, when taken, is increasingly discretionary and is sub­
ject only with difficulty to legal controls. In its broader formulation, refer­
ring to its initial purposes, the principle of subsidiarity is intended to increase 
the openness and democracy of Community decision-making and hence of the 
Community system. Yet the way in which the principle has been interpreted 
may lead to implementation by means of an inter-institutional agreement, a 
singularly untransparent Community instrument. It thus may simply worsen 
the problem of legitimacy.
20 Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, 
Annex I to Part A, 'Overall Approach to the Application by the Council of the 
Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union', p. 9.
2 * See also 'Subsidiarité: Nouveau code de conduite pour construire l'Europe', 
(Commission des Communautés Européennes, Bulletin mensuel du Bureau en Belgique), 




























































































Institutional Practice and the Meaning of Soft Law
The meaning of Community soft law will be determined to a large extent by 
the practice of Community institutions. With regard to Commission soft law 
in particular, a fundamental part is being played by the European courts. The 
European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, each within its 
sphere of jurisdiction, are meant to ensure that in the Community system 'the 
law is observed'.22 Not all forms of Commission soft law have been consid­
ered so far by courts. The cases to date concern communications; codes of 
conduct; codes, guidelines or frameworks; and internal instructions.2  ̂ In de­
ciding these cases, the European courts, while fulfilling the judicial function, 
have helped to define the balance in practice between legality, efficiency and 
legitimacy in the Community system.
The European courts are not however merely passive and reactive. As judi­
cial institutions, viewed in isolation, they obtain their cases in a reactive man­
ner. From the standpoint of the Commission, however, the decisions of the 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance constitute structures, in the 
sense that they are 'simultaneously representations of previous outcomes as 
well as frameworks, influences and sometimes determinants of continuing 
conflicts and compromises'.24 Judicial decisions thus not only elaborate the 
norms comprising Community law. They are among the determinants of 
Community policy and of the basic features of Community institutional law 
and politics.
22 Art. 164 EEC; see also Koenraad Lenaerts, 'The Development of the Judicial Process in 
the European Community after the Establishment of the Court of First Instance’, Vol I, 
Book I (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1991), pp 53-113 at 70, 86-89.
22 This terminology is that used by the Commission. It also presents the measures starting 
with those which apparently are farthest from the EEC Treaty. For a classification of soft 
law (in the United Kingdom) according to function, see Robert Baldwin and John 
Houghton, ’Circular Arguments; The Status and Legitimacy of Administrative Rules', 
1986, pp 239-284. For a classification of Community soft law according to forum, form 
and content, see K.C. Wellens and G.M. Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community 
Law’, 14, 1989, pp 267-321 at 300-301.




























































































In seeking to determine the meaning of Commission soft law in practice, we 
need to view the Commission and the Court in interaction: not necessarily as 
acting in tandem, for example to advance European integration; still less as 
partners in negotiating through litigation the shape of the Community of the 
future; but rather, and more modestly, as each having an effect on the other, 
such that the result of each institution's decisional processes are incorporated 
as an input into the decisional processes of the other. The interaction between 
the Commission and the European courts is not, however, merely a process of 
reciprocity. Instead it is recursive: it involves the reproduction of both insti­
tutions and norms, and the processes of reproduction occur in and by means 
of practices which are organised by these institutions and norms.25 The 
Commission and the Court of Justice together thus constitute what Giddens 
has called a structural set, which is 'formed through the mutual convertability 
of rules and resources in one domain of action into those pertaining to 
another’.26
The point of departure for analysing this process depends on one's objectives. 
For the present purposes, we will conceive of it as beginning with a 
Commission soft law. The soft law then is considered by a court, and the ju­
dicial decision subsequently influences the practice of the Commission, either 
with regard to the same subject matter or in more general terms of institu­
tional practice. The following discussion focusses on a single case, which re­
veals with particular clarity the recursive relations between the Commission 
and the Court of Justice.
25 Anthony Giddens, (London: Hutchinson, 1975), esp. pp 118-126. They thus exemplify 
'the duality of structure, that is, that social structures are both constituted by human 
agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitutionjibid., p. 121; 
original emphasis omitted],
26 Anthony Giddens, 'A Reply to My Critics', in David Held and John B. Thompson, 





























































































Case 310/85 Deufil 27 concerned Commission guidelines in the form of a 
code on state aids to the textile industry. The case was brought under Article 
173(2) EEC by a manufacturer of synthetic fibres. The plaintiff sought the 
annulment of a Commission decision, according to which the aid granted to 
the plaintiff under the German law relating to investment subsidies and the 
joint Federal Government/ regional aid programme was illegal and should be 
recovered.
The aid code was the latest in a series of Commission measures concerning 
the textile sector. On 30 July 1971 the Commission addressed to the Member 
States a memorandum entitled 'Containment at Community level of aid to the 
textile industry'. In 1977 it drew up new guidelines addressed to the Member 
States under the title 'Consideration of the present position in regard to aid to 
the textile and clothing industry'. Subsequently, by letter of 19 July 1977, it 
notified the Member States of an 'aid code' concerning synthetic fibres and 
yarns; the code was extended in 1979, 1981 and 1983.28 Finally, on 4 July 
1985 the Commission notified the Member States that it considered that the 
system of supervision of aid introduced in 1977 should be extended to July 
1987. In addition, not only should it continue to cover acrylic, polyester and 
polyamide; it should also be extended to polypropylene fibre and yarns.
The changing form of these measures reflected the Commission's growing 
concern about the textile market during a period of fifteen years. As the 
Commission's view of the market became more pessimistic, the document 
evolved from memorandum to guidelines and then to an aid code. The mea­
sures thus tended gradually towards formalism, obligation and legalism,
27 v [1987] ECR 901





























































































though without ever taking the form of a legally binding act. It was, however, 
always recognised by the Commission that, regardless of its formal title, the 
document was without prejudice to the provisions of the EEC Treaty. 
Nevertheless the measures increasingly gave precise policy directions to the 
Member States, described specific consequences for action inconsistent with 
its content, and, by necessary implication, spelled out with greater clarity the 
basic substantive principles of Commission state aids decisions in the textile 
sector.29
In 1983 the German Federal Government and North Rhine-Westphalia 
granted aid to the applicant. The aid was not previously notified to the 
Commission. In February 1984 the Federal Government informed the 
Commission of the aid. The Commission concluded that the aid was an in­
fringement of Article 93(3) EEC. On 10 July 1985 it adopted the contested 
decision.
The arguments of the parties focussed on the the interpretation of the aid code 
and its effects. The applicant claimed that it had received the aid on the basis 
of definitive decisions and precise instructions, and that it had used the aid to 
convert its production to a product not then subject to the 'code'. In its view, 
the aid was acceptable because the products of its factory were not covered by 
the code. It argued therefore that the Commission's order to Germany to re­
cover the aid was contrary to the principle of legitimate expectations. In the 
view of the Commmission, ultimately accepted by the Court of Justice,30 
however, the applicant had used the aid for normal modernisation, not for 
restructuring. Not only had the applicant increased its production capacity for 
polyamide yarn, which had always been covered by the code. It also increased
29 See at [1987] ECR 901 at 902-903 (Report for the Hearing).




























































































its capacity for polypropylene fibre, which though 'not subject at the material 
time to the aid code, was in oversupply in the Community[;] the Commission 
had never regarded a change to polypropylene as 'restructuring' under the aid 
code. '31
These arguments can be summarised as follows. First, Deufil argued basically 
that its action was permitted because it was not prohibited by the code. 
Implicit in this argument was the applicant's view that the code had normative 
stability, if not (legally) binding force. The Commission countered this argu­
ment directly by suggesting that the fact that the applicant's behaviour was not 
prohibited by the code did not mean that it was permissible. In other words, 
soft law is not law at all; it can be changed any time because it is simply a 
more or less direct reflection of (changing) policy.
Second, emphasising the normative nature of the code, Deufil argued that its 
author, the Commission, was bound by its terms. This argument was not met 
by the Commission directly, most likely, it may be suggested, because of the 
obstacle posed by previous Court of Justice decisions. The leading case was 
Case 81/72 Commission v Council32 It involved a decision by the Council to 
apply for a three-year period a specific system of adjusting the salaries of 
Community staff. Advocate-General Warner had considered that the decision 
'could have no legal effect, but should be regarded merely as a policy 
decision'; ’[njotwithstanding its undeniable political importance, it was, in 
law, no better than a rope in sand'.33 The Court of Justice, however, held that 
the decision was binding on its author, and that the Council could not validly
31 See [1987] ECR 901 at 905, 907, 908 (Report for the Hearing). On the economic 
context, see also R. W. Shaw and S. A. Shaw, ‘Excess Capacity and Rationalisation in 
the West European Synthetic Fibres Industry’, Journal o f Industrial Economics, 32, 2 
December 1983, pp. 149-166.
32 [1973] ECR 575.




























































































adopt a Regulation which was not in accordance with its terms.34 Against this 
normative background, the Commission suggested in Deufil that the plaintiff 
was not entitled to claim a legitimate expectations that it should keep the aid, 
essentially because the plaintiffs interest was not worthy of protection. The 
Commission argued, inter alia that the aid was granted on the basis of false 
information, as the plaintiff had not indicated that the plant would be used 
partly for producing polyamide yarn. It also argued that the applicant knew 
that aid for such a purpose could not be paid without Commission 
authorisation.35 In other words, even if soft law (though it is not hard law) 
may for the sake of argument be recognised as potentially having legal 
effects, it did not have any legal effects in the present circumstances.
The implicit contradictions in the Commission's two arguments were not ad­
dressed by either the Advocate-General or the Court of Justice. Instead, both 
the Advocate-General and the Court of Justice agreed that the aid code did not 
derogate from the Treaty, that it could not legally do so, that it was not 
legally binding, and that it did not provide an independent basis for a negative 
decision by the Commission. They expressed these views differently, how­
ever, and with divergent implications.
According to Advocate-General Darmon,
'[a]lthough [the code] reflects the Commission's concept of Community 
interest and defines the line of conduct which it wishes to see Member 
States adopt, it in no way dispenses the latter, when they are consider-
34 The implications of the case law are however ambiguous: see John A Usher, 'General 
Course in European Community Law: The Continuing Development of Law and 
Institutions', Collected Courses o f the Academy o f European Law, Vol II, Book I 
(Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1992), pp 37-165 at 73-77; Jürgen Schwarze, (London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1992), pp. 1080-1085.
35 See [1987] ECR 901 at 911. This argument was also perfectly consistent with German 
law, of which the plaintiff of course would have been well aware: du 25.5.1976, Art. 
48(2)(2). See Francois Hubeau, 'Le principe de la protection de la confiance légitime 
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes', 19, 1, 1983, 
pp 143-162 at 145-146; see also Jürgen Schwarze, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1992), 




























































































ing aid in a given case, from complying strictly with the terms of 
Articles 92 and 93. In other words, the 'guidelines' and the 'aid code' 
constitute a frame of reference, reinforcing, in particular, the obliga­
tion of notice laid down in Article 93(3) but they cannot be regarded as 
legally binding and thus capable of forming the basis of a negative de­
cision by the institution.' 36
However, he granted that the code represented the Commission's definition of 
the general interest of the synthetic fibres sector, and more generally of the 
textile industry. Thus, in his view, the plaintiff could not claim to have been 
unaware that an investment that would enable it to increase production of 
polyamide, as well as of polypropylene, was contrary to this interest. 
Consequently, the code did not provide any basis for legitimate 
expectations.37
Giving rather less normative force to the aid code, the Court of Justice 
largely followed the argument of the Commission. The Court of Justice stated 
'[t]he aid code constitutes guidelines setting out the course of conduct which 
the Commission intends to follow and with which it asks the Member States to 
comply in regard to aid to the synthetic yarns and fibres sector. It does not 
derogate from the provisions of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty, nor could it 
do so'.38 The Court of Justice held that the aid code, more specifically the 
fact that polypropylene yarns were not covered by the aid code, could not
36 [1987] ECR 901 at 914.
37 [1987] ECR 901 at 920 (Opinion of Advocate-General Darmon.
38 [1987] ECR 901 at 927 [para 22], This statement in part has been summarised, not alto­
gether precisely, as '[rjecently the European Court, in connection with the protection of 
legitimate expectation, has declared that the aid code contains indictative rules outlining 
the Commission's future policy. The Commission requires from the Member States that 
they stick to these rules in the sphere of state aid to that sector': K.C. Wellens and G.M. 
Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community Law', 14, 1989, pp 267-321 at 315-316. 
The slight but significant differences of wording and meaning between the summary and 
the Court of Justice's language tend to confer on the aid code a more legalistic tenor, and 
more legal effects, than the Court of Justice seemed to have intended. It is however worth 
noting that the article from which the summary is drawn was a translation from Dutch to 
English. In addition to exemplifying the difficulty of legal translation, these differences in 
words and meaning illustrate perhaps the role of legal scholarship ( )  in the extrapolation, 




























































































give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of undertakings which could 
be relied on against an order issued by the Commission to the national au­
thorities. 39
Instead of assuming the normative status of the code and saying to the appli­
cant that 'your interest does not deserve protection', the Court of Justice thus 
accepted the Commission's view that the code was essentially a statement of 
policy, subject to alteration according to circumstances and at the discretion 
of its author. It may be suggested that the Court's view of the legitimacy of 
the applicant's claim might have influenced its decision to classify the code as 
policy rather than law. For example, the Court noted that the aid had actually 
resulted in a substantial increase in Deufil's capacity to produce polyamide 
yarn.40 No such consideration concerning the code appears, however, on the 
face of the judgment. Consequently, in the Court's view, the aid code was 
designed perhaps to structure the exercise of Commission discretion with 
regard to products covered by the code. But it could not fetter the 
Commission's discretion under Articles 92 and 93 EEC to take decisions with 
regard to products which were not covered by the code. In other words, in 
the realm of policy, as distinct from the realm of law, what is not forbidden 
is not necessarily permitted.
Commission Soft Law as the Context of Judicial Decision
We can begin to tease out the implications of Deufil by examining the 
contexts, both normative and commercial, of the judicial decision. From the
39 [ 1987] ECR 901 at 927 [para 21].
40 Deufil applied for the aid to replace equipment capable of producing 3000 tonnes of 
polyamide yarn annually with equipment having an annual capacity of 5000 tonnes of 
polyamide and polypropylene yarn. According to information provided by Deufil to the 
Court, however, the capacity of the new equipment was 6000 tonnes and the intended 
conversion to polypropylene yam had not yet been carried out in 1985, with the result 
that 4191 tonnes of polyamide yarn and 1546 tonnes of polypropylene yarn were pro­




























































































standpoint of the Commission, the normative context of the case comprised 
two elements. The first element consisted of previous judgments by the Court 
of Justice. Prior to Deufil the Court of Justice had decided that Article 93(3) 
EEC was directly effective,41 that this prohibition applied to any aid 
introduced by a Member State without having been duly notified,42 and that 
the Commission need not fix any time limit when applying the Article 93(2) 
procedure to unnotified, implemented aid.43
The second element consisted of a Commission soft law. On 24 November 
1983 the Commission had issued a Communication regarding the recovery of 
illegally paid state aids.44 The Communication informed potential recipients 
of state aids that they might have to refund any aid paid to them before the 
Commission had reached a final decision under Article 93(3). According to 
its terms, the Communication in turn stemmed a previous judgment by the 
Court of Justice, namely the Court's interpretation of Article 93(3) EEC in 
Lorenz45. It was intended to put into practice 'the possibility given to [the 
Commission] by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 12 July 1983 in Case 
70/72'46 of requiring Member States to recover from recipients illegally 
granted aid. It was published in the C series of the Official Journal.
The Commission Communication of November 1983 thus exemplified the ab­
sorption of a Court of Justice decision into Commission practice. By notifying 
potential recipients of state aids of likely Commission policy, it was intended
41 Case 78/76 v [1977] ECR 595.
42 Case 120/73 v [1973] ECR 1471.
43 Case 120/73 v [1973] ECR 1471; Case 173/73 v [1974] ECR 709. But see also Case 
223/85 v [1987] ECR 4617, judgment in which was deiivered nine months after . Note 
that subsequently it was held that the fact that a state aid has not been notified does not 
entitle the Commission to decide that the aid is per se incompatible with the Common 
Market: Case C-301/87 v [1990] ECR 1-307
44 Commission Communication [untitled], OJ 24.11.83 C318/3.
43 Case 120/73 v [1973] ECR 1471; the Communication also referred to Case 121/73 v 
[1973] ECR 1495, Case 122/73 v [1973] ECR 1511, and Case 141/73 v [1973] ECR 
1527.




























































































to prevent litigation. In addition to being incorporated into Commission soft 
law norms, however, the judicial decision also had a direct influence on 
Commission practice. It marked the beginning of a period when the 
Commission pursued vigourously the principle of recovery of unnotified, 
implemented state aids.47
Deufil arose in this context of interrelated norms and institutional practice. 
The German Federal Government notified the Commission of the aid 
previously granted to Deufil less than three months after the Commission 
issued the Communication. In the subsequent judicial proceedings, however, 
none of the parties, the Advocate-General or the Court of Justice referred to 
the Communication. Yet it is scarcely credible that they were not aware of its 
contents. It is possible, indeed perhaps likely, that even Deufil knew of the 
Communication; one may suggest that, at least in the view of the Commission, 
the company certainly should have known. From the technical legal stand­
point, however, there was no need to argue or decide the case on the basis of 
any soft law; as will be shown later, Deufil was entirely consistent with the 
previous case law of the Court. Yet, it may be suggested, the Commission's 
November 1983 Communication formed part of the political and policy 
context in which the case was argued, heard and decided.48
47 Sylviane Morson, 'La récupération des aides octroyées par les Etats en violation du traité 
C.E.E.', 21, 3, 1990, pp 409-440 at 422 et seq., 427.
48 It is noteworthy that, nine months later, the Court of Justice in Case 223/85 v [1987] 
ECR 4617 held that the Commission's delay in giving a contested decision could estab­
lish a legitimate expectation so as to prevent the recovery of aid. Advocate-General Slynn 
(at 4643) treated the case as involving a failure on the part of the Commission to show 
due diligence, thus leading RSV to assume that the Commission did not object to the aid. 
The Court pointed to the Commission Communication of November 1983 with regard to 
the onus placed on economic operators to verify that proper procedures had been fol­
lowed. See also Piet Jan Slot, 'Procedural Aspects of State Aids: The Guardian of 




























































































Judicial Language As A Model For Commission Soft Law
Similarly, the language of the judicial decision provided a model for later 
Commission soft law, that is, contributed to the social and legal process of its 
production and reproduction. Let us consider first whether the aid code ac­
tually influenced the result of the case. On the one hand, the company's ar­
gument concerning legitimate expectations was not accepted by the Court of 
Justice. In this respect, however, Deufil was in no way unusual. Arguments 
based on the principle of legitimate expectations are frequently advanced 
before the Court of Justice, but they are rarely successful.49 On the other 
hand, the Commission was entitled in Deufil to order the recovery of the non- 
notified aid. This result is also consistent with that of other cases, in which 
Commission soft law was entirely absent or no argument concerning soft law 
was made.50
Taken together, these two points seem to suggest that Deufil in the aid code 
had little if any effect on the specific case result. If particular legal questions 
were raised by the aid code in particular or soft law in general, they were 
apparently not considered in detail by the Court of Justice. The Court of 
Justice simply 'looked through' the norms of soft law and reached, or at least
49 See generally Eleanor Sharpston, ’Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality’, 15, 
1990, pp 103-160, esp. 132-133, 160; see also Francois Hubeau, ’Le principe de la pro­
tection de la confiance légitime dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des 
Communautés européennes’, 19, 1, 1983, pp 143-162, Sylviane Morson, ’La récupéra­
tion des aides octroyées par les Etats en violation du traité C.E.E.’, 21, 3, 1990, pp 409- 
440 at 429. For the argument that in appropriate circumstances soft law should be capable 
of giving rise to legitimate expectations, see Melchior, ’Les communications de la 
Commission; Contribution à l’étude des actes communautaires non prévus par les traités’, 
in vol. 2 (Paris: Nathan; Brussels: Labor, 1979), pp. 243-258 at 254, 257. With regard 
to the recovery of non-notified aid, however, the Court of Justice has held in 1989 that, 
where proceedings are brought against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligation 
by not implementing a Commission decision requiring it to recover illegal aid and which it 
did not seek to have annulled, the only defence left to the Member State is to plead that it 
was absolutely impossible for it to implement the decision properly: Case 94/87 v [1989] 
ECR 175. This facts of the case occurred about the same time as those in even though the 
judgment was rendered almost two years later ( : 24 February 1987; : 2 February 1989).
50 See Sylviane Morson, ’La récupération des aides octroyées par les Etats en violation du 




























































































stated, its decision on other, substantive grounds. In addition, even from the 
standpoint of legal commentators on the case, the aid code in Deufil seems to 
have been transparent, if not invisible.51
In Deufil the Court of Justice stated that the aid code could not derogate from 
the Treaty. It also did not recognise the aid code as giving rise to legitimate 
expectations. This is not to say, however, that the Court of Justice denied all 
status to soft law in general, or even to the aid code in particular. Such a 
conclusion would be based only on a retrospective view, as if we were using 
the judgment as a rear-view mirror in order partially to reflect the past. 
Continuing the metaphor, let us instead, however, conceive of the judgment as 
a windscreen, in other words prospectively, through which to view the fu­
ture. From this perspective, the description by the Court of Justice of the aid 
code in Deufil had real effects.
On 22 December 1988 the Commission took a decision to implement, on the 
basis of Article 93(1) EEC, a Community framework on State aids to the 
motor vehicle industry. The act was not a formal decision in the sense of 
Article 189 EEC. The measure had been examined at a multilateral meeting 
by the representatives of the Member States.52 The Commission on 31 
December 1988 informed the Member States of the decision by letter. The 
framework was subsequently published in the C series of the Official
51 The doctrinal importance of has been described as being, first, in the reminder by the 
Court of Justice that the notification procedure is designed partly to avoid endangering 
any legitimate expédions, and, second, and more precisely, in the conclusion that 'a 
subsidy granted without the required notification cannot form a valid basis for a legitimate 
expectation on the part of the recipient of the aid which is capable of protection.' See, re­
spectively, Sylviane Morson, 'La récupération des aides octroyées par les Etats en viola­
tion du traité C.E.E.', 21, 3, 1990, pp 409-440 at 429, n. 114; and Jürgen Schwarze, 
(Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1992), p. 1075.
52 Community Framework on State Aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry (8 9 /0  23/03), OJ 




























































































Journal.53 It was expressed as a proposal by the Commission to the Member 
States. Acting under Article 93(3) EEC, the Commission proposed that, as 
from 1 January 1989, and in accordance with specified rules, the Member 
States notify significant cases of state aid in the motor vehicle sector.
Despite its soft law character, the measure was treated seriously by the par­
ties. It provoked a very formal reaction from the German Government, 
which 'formally informed' the Commission of its decision not to apply the 
Community framework and of its reasons for this decision.54 In an equally 
formal reply, the Commission then informed the German Government by 
letter that 'if ...[the German authorities] failed to ... [reconsider their posi­
tion], it would be forced to initiate the Article 93(2) procedure in respect of 
all aid schemes in operation in Germany for the benefit of the motor vehicle 
industry, with the objective of enforcing the application o f the fram ew ork'^
The Commission argued that it was justified in introducing new restrictions 
on existing state aid schemes. In support, it adduced the Deufilcase. It stated 
that:
'The Commission does not accept the argument that, given the indepen­
dence of the Member States as concerns regional and general aid 
schemes, it is not justified in introducing new restrictions on existing 
schemes. The Court of Justice stated in its judgment of 24 February 
1987 in Deufil (case 310/85) that a framework on State aid in a 
particular sector provides guidelines setting out the course of conduct 
which the Commission intends to follow and with which it asks 
Member States to comply when granting aid in the sector in question. 
The Court considered that such a framework does not contain 
derogations from Articles 92 and 93. The assessment by the 
Commission of individual awards under existing regional and general
53 Community Framework on State Aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry (89/C123/03), OJ 
18.5.89 C123/3.
54 Ibid., preamble, fourth recital, OJ 20.7.90 L 188/85.




























































































aid schemes will therefore always be based on the provisions of 
Articles 92 and 93.'56
For our purposes, this statement has a two-fold importance.
First, it marks the creation of Commission soft law on the basis of judicial 
language that did not form part of, or at least was not necessary for, the prior 
specific judicial decision (dispositif). Indeed, as already seen, the Court of 
Justice in Deufil treated the aid code as transparent. Yet the Commission 
absorbed this judicial language, incorporating it as part of the raw material of 
the Commission's own working practices. In doing so, the Commission in 
effect borrowed a typical tool of the Court of Justice: namely the use in later 
situations of 'significant principles which, expressed in key paragraphs of the 
judgment, encompass not only the particular case but also potential future 
situations'.57
Second, the Court's language in Deufil was limited to a specific case. On this 
basis, however, the Commission has created a general model of (Commission) 
soft law. In Deufil the Court of Justice referred simply to the textiles aid 
code' and to 'aid to the synthetic yarns and fibres sector',58 not to 'a 
framework on State aid in a particular sector' or to 'when granting aid in the 
sector in question'. Similarly, the Court treated only the question as to 
whether the textiles aid code derogated from Articles 92 and 93 EEC, rather 
than the relation to the Treaty of 'such framework[s]' in general. It was 
concerned, necessarily, with the individual case. The Commission interpreted 
the judgment as referring, however, not to an isolated instance of soft law,
5^ Commission Decision of 21 February 1990 amending German aid schemes for the motor 
vehicle industry (90/381/EEC), OJ 20.7.90 L188/55 at L188/58.
57 Francis Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques', 56, 1993, pp 19-54 at 50.




























































































still less a particular sector, but rather to an exemplar, a normative model of 
soft law. By generalising from the language of the Court of Justice in the 
Commission thus used the judgment to legitimate further soft law, namely 
analogous codes in other sectors.
From Soft Law to Hard Law by Administrative Decision
Soft law, once elaborated, may sometimes be transformed into hard law. The 
transformation usually occurs by judicial decision or legislation. Deufil 
illustrates the first alternative, though it represents a negative case. The Court 
of Justice did not view the aid code as hard law, it declined to grant it any 
legal effects, and it treated it as merely transparent. An example of the second 
alternative is the current discussion concerning the enactment as a regulation 
of a measure which began as a Commission code of conduct on the report of 
fraud against the Community.59 In addition, however, in the Community 
system soft law may be transformed into hard law by administrative decision. 
Such acts are taken in accordance with Article 189 EEC. In principle 
administrative decisions are discrete, but in Community practice it is not 
always easy to distinguish them clearly from general legislation.60
The protest by Germany concerning the application by the Commission of the 
framework on State aids to the motor vehicle industry led to a series of 
meetings between the two parties. The discussions did not, however, result in 
German compliance. Consequently, on 21 February 1990 the Commission 
adopted a formal Decision concerning the application to Germany of the
59 Code of conduct on the implementing provisions for Article 23(1) of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4253/88 relating to irregularities and the organisation of an information system 
for irregularities, OJ 1990 C220/3; see also Case C-303/90 v [1991] ECR1-5315.




























































































Community framework on state aid to the motor vehicle industry.61 For the 
present purposes the Decision is of interest in three respects.
First, even discounting for context and hindsight, it reveals the Commission's 
view of the state aids framework. As described in the Decision, the frame­
work ' required prior notification of all State aid measures granted within the 
scope of approved aid schemes to motor vehicle manufacturers where the 
project cost exceeds ECU 12 million, entered into force on 1 January 1989 
and [wa]s valid  for two years.'62 The Commission’s objective was 'in 
particular to secure the modification of all existing aid schemes applicable in 
the motor vehicle sector and to make it compulsory to give prior notification 
of individual awards in accordance with the criteria laid down in the 
framework, especially the criterion concerning project costs exceeding ECU 
12 million.' 63 This version, gloss or interpretation of the soft law language is 
much more legalistic, formal and coercive than that of the original text.
Second, the Decision shows the extent to which this legalistic conception of 
the framework was shared by the two parties. During the prior negotiations, 
both the German government and the Commission viewed the framework as a 
potential basis of further measures, norms and possibly obligations. The 
German authorities argued inter alia that the framework would be used 'to 
enforce measures which are motivated by industrial policy pursuant to 
Articles 92 and 93 EEC', thus constituting an abuse of these Treaty articles.64 
In their view, investment decisions should be left to the market rather than 
being ' re g u la ted  by means of a central control system', viz. the
61 Commission Decision of 21 February 1990 amending German aid schemes for the motor 
vehicle industry (90/381/EEC), OJ 20.7.90 L188/55.
62 Commission Decision 90/381/EEC, preamble, first recital, OJ 20.7.90, L188/55 at 
L188/55 (emphasis added).
63 Ibid., preamble, second recital, OJ L188/55 at L I88/55 (emphasis added).





























































































framework.65 For its part, the Commission referred, inter alia to 'the strict 
discipline imposed by the framework'.66 After citing the judgment of the 
Court of Justice in Deufil the Commission pointed out that 'even if the 
framework in question is simply a recommendation the German authorities 
have nevertheless already had 14 months in which to amend their laws in 
order to comply with the framework.'67 The parties disagreed on the need 
for Commission co-ordination of the formulation of policy with Member 
States, as well as on whether the Community had legal competence to adopt an 
industrial policy. They shared, however, the view that the state aids 
framework had a normative force. The framework may have been soft law, 
but it was distinguished from hard law only by a very fine line.
Third, and most importantly, the February 1990 Decision transformed soft 
law into hard law. Not only was it designed to enforce the soft law frame­
work; it also incorporated directly some of its terms. From the legal stand­
point, as required by Article 190 EEC. the Decision was based on the Rome 
Treaty, in casu the first subparagraph of Article 93(2) EEC. However, its 
essential substantive elements included the Community framework. Thus, the 
Decision required Germany to notify the Commission of all aid measures 
above a specified amount to undertakings in the motor vehicle sector as 
defined in the framework. Notification was to be effected in conformity with
65 Ibid., preamble, ninth recital, subpara 4, OJ 20.7.90 L188/55 at L188/56.
66 Ibid., preamble, eleventh recital, subpara 3, OJ 20.7.90 L188/55 at L188/57 (emphasis 
added). The Decision states that
'[tjhe Commission fully shares the view that investment decisions should be left to the 
market and not be transferred to an administrative authority. In this context it is evident 
that the framework is not designed to put the Commission in the role of guiding invest­
ment decisions in specific directions but, on the contrary, to that such decisions are in­
deed taken by the investors concerned, that any State aid is consistent with the common 
interest as established by the Treaty, and that the aid is in strict proportion to the problems 
which they intend to resolve. Indeed, the Commission seeks to by means of the frame­
work that investors are not influenced in their decisions by the availability of unilateral 
funds. (Ibid., preamble, eleventh recital, subparagraph 4, OJ 20.7.90 L I88/55 at 
L I88/57 (emphasis added)).





























































































the requirements laid down in the framework. Germany was also to provide 
annual reports as required by the framework.68 In this way Commission soft 
law was enforced by being incorporated into hard law. The Commission 
Decision thus represents a further transformation of the Court's language, 
building upon its earlier elaboration by the Commission into a more general 
normative model, but incorporating its implications into a legally binding 
Decision.
Soft Law, Efficiency, Legality And Legitimacy
Commission soft law provides an ideal vehicle for examining the working 
practices of the Commission and the Court of Justice, as well as the reladons 
between these two institutions. The Deufil saga is an especially illuminating 
example. It shows how soft law may form part of the implicit context of 
judicial decisions, how judicial language can be elaborated and generalised in 
the form of soft law, and how soft law, based partly on a court judgment, is 
transformed into hard law by administrative decision.
In the Community political and legal system the Commission and the Court of 
Justice have a fundamental place. Except in legal terms, however, their roles 
are not always clearly defined.69 Yet from a contextual standpoint any analy­
sis of these institutions and relations between them requires that each institu­
tion should be taken seriously, for example both as a legal and as a political
68 Ibid., Article 1, OJ 20.7.90 L188/55 at L188/60.
69 The classic article is Pierre Pescatore, 'L'exécutif communautaire: Justification du quadri­
partisme institué par les traités de Paris et de Rome', 1978, 387-406. Inter-institutional 
relations are often discussed in terms of institutional balance but this concept is relatively 
indeterminate. See Roland Beiber, 'The Settlement of Institutional Conflicts on the Basis 
of Article 4 of the EEC Treaty', 21, 1984, pp 505-523. On the Commission, see, e.g., 
Karlheinz Neunreither, 'Transformation of a Political Role: Reconsidering the Case of the 
Commission of the European Communities', 10, 3, March 1972, pp 233-248; Sabino 
Cassese and Giacinto della Cananea, 'The Commission of the European Communities: 
the Administrative Ramifications of its Political Development (1957-1967), in 4: (Nomos, 




























































































institution. One approach to doing so is to note that the Commission and the 
Court of Justice share two significant features. The first feature applies to all 
organisations: 'survival is necessary for effectiveness’, and 'legitimacy is nec­
essary for survival'.70 The second feature is specific to the Community sys­
tem: more than other Community institutions, the Commission and the Court 
of Justice have been concerned, by and large, to promote normative (and de­
cisional) supranationalism.71 Viewed in the context of the Maastrict Treaty 
debate, these features render the lessons of the Deufil saga salient and 
problematic. In the course of working together, the Commission and the 
Court of Justice create, maintain, ignore, negate or transform Commission 
soft law. How they do so may not affect their survival, but it is likely to 
influence directly their effectiveness and legitimacy.
In the Deufil saga soft law served two purposes. On the one hand, it provided 
a way of structuring Commission discretion. This is a classic function of soft 
law,72 which may also be unproblematic in the Community system. With this 
purpose in mind, it has been suggested that recourse to soft law is justified, 
but that soft law should be used cautiously: economic integration and judicial 
protection of the individual need to be finely balanced.73 The suggestion is 
pertinent, especially since current Commission policy is to make increasing 
use of communications to encourage greater transparency and to channel par­
ticipation in decision-making.74 As Deufil illustrates, however, it is necessary
70 See Lawrence B. Mohr, The Concept of Organizational G o a l 67, June 1973, pp 470- 
481.
7 1 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, 'The Community System: The Dual Character of 
Supranationalism', 1, 1981, pp 267-306; see also Joseph H.H. Weiler, 'The 
Transformation of Europe', 100, June 1991, pp 2403-2483.
72 See, for example, Robert Baldwin and John Houghton, 'Circular Arguments: The Status 
and Legitimacy of Administrative Rules', 1986, pp 239-284.
73 K.C. Wellens and G.M. Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community Law', 14, 1989, 
pp 267-321 at 320-321.
74 See Commission of the European Communities, 'An Open and Structured Dialogue be­
tween the Commission and Special Interest Groups', Communication from the 




























































































to go further. Even if Deufil had used the aid for purposes entirely outside 
the code, it might still have lost the case. The view expressed by the Court of 
Justice that the interpretative soft law was policy, not law, could have tilted 
the scales towards administrative discretion and economic integration, instead 
of towards legitimate expectations and judicial protection.
On the other hand, the soft law in Deufil served as a substitute for legislation. 
This use of soft law is frequent in international relations, where legal rules 
may be difficult to promulgate and soft law often serves as 'a compromise 
between sovereignty and order'.75 Especially in the light of the Maastricht 
Treaty, it could be suggested that the Community system is moving gradually 
towards a similar pattern. Soft law might then be viewed as a useful form of 
regulation, a means of co-ordinating relations among Member States and of 
balancing unity and diversity. It would provide a feasible alternative to 
minimum harmonisation, regulatory competition or opting-out. It could 
represent a suitable compromise to settle disputes, whether between the 
Community and the Member States, the Member States themselves or 
sometimes different parts of the Commission.76 As with other forms of 
regulation in the Community, thus contrasting with much of international 
law, soft law would also be subject ultimately to judicial supervision.
In the Community system, however, at least as it stands at the moment, this 
use of soft law inevitably raises issues of legitimacy. In Deufil Commission
European Communities, ’Increased Transparency in the Work of the Commission', 
Communication from the Commission, SEC(92) 2274 final (Brussels, 2 December 
1992). Both, it should be noted, are informative rather than interpretative communica­
tions.
75 Michael Bothe, 'Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A Meaningful Distinction in International 
Relations', 11, 1980, pp 65-95 at 90.
n  zr r  r
,0 An example of the third category is Commission Recommendation 90/109 on the trans­
parency of banking conditions, OJ 1990 L67/39. I am grateful to Stephen Weatherill for 
this example, as well as for the more general comparison between international law and 




























































































soft law was used to fill the 'gap' that resulted from the failure of other 
institutions, namely the Council, to enact implementing legislation.77 'If the 
non-legal norm is hailed because it circumvents the obstacles involved in the 
creation of a legal norm, one must not forget that a number of these 
obstacles, unpleasant as they may appear to a particular decision-maker, have 
a justification of their own'.78 In these circumstances, it is not simply the 
choice of a specific type of act which is in question: the form of decision­
making, the extent of popular participation, and political legitimacy are also 
at issue. The use of soft law thus raises in a very acute way the problematic 
relationship between efficiency, legality and legitimacy.
Though most significant regarding state aids perhaps, the use of soft law in 
this way is unlikely to be limited to this field. Instead, it may be hypothe­
sised,79 it is simply an indication of a more general phenomenon within the 
Community legal system, namely a shift from conditional programmes to 
purposive programmes. The design of regulatory policy thus has a direct and 
immediate influence on the use of law. This process is common to the legal 
systems of all industrial societies. It raises especially difficult issues in the 
Community system, however, because an increase in economic integration 
and the substantial Europeanisation of policy-making have not been accom­
panied by the development of widely accepted political institutions.
In the United States legal scholars have argued for a partnership between 
regulatory agencies and courts. Not only would the partnership control regu-
77 On the refusal of the Council to adopt regulations on the basis of Article 94 EEC, see Erik 
J. Pijnacker Hordijk, 'Judicial Protection of Private Interests under the EEC Competition 
Rules relating to State Aids', 1, 1985, pp 67-98 at 70-77, 96-97; Piet Jan Slot, 
'Procedural Aspects of State Aids: The Guardian of Competition versus the Subsidy 
Villains?', 27, 1990, pp 741-760 at 741-744, 759-760; Sylviane Morson, 'La récupéra­
tion des aides octroyées par les Etats en violation du traité C.E.E.’, 21, 3, 1990, pp 409- 
440 at 440; Enzo Moavero Milanesi, 'Partecipazione dello Stato nelle Imprese e Disciplina 
Comunitaria degli Aiuti Pubblici’, 1990, pp 515-576 at 530, 573-575.
78 Michael Bothe, 'Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A Meaningful Distinction in International 
Relations', 11, 1980, pp 65-95 at 93.




























































































latory bureaucracies; it would also enable agencies to pursue worthwhile so­
cial objectives.80 As Deufil suggests, however, in the Community system such 
a partnership may place an intolerably heavy burden on the Commission and 
the Court of Justice, viewed as both legal and political institutions. In addi­
tion, it may increase private rather than public control of regulation, encour­
age defensive decision-making by regulatory agencies and make courts the 
ultimate arbiters of policy.8!
The example of soft law thus illuminates the specific features of the 
Community's system and its lack of strong institutions for broad political 
participation at Community level. For example, the Community differs 
significantly from national administrative systems. On the one hand, in 
national administrations the use of soft law may have relatively little effect on 
the constitutionally established relations between institutions. In the 
Community, however. Commission soft law tends not simply to channel the 
Commission's use of its implementing powers, but also, and perhaps more 
problematically, to expand the Commission's role in relation to other 
institutions. On the other hand, national administrative use of soft law occurs 
within a framework of legislation enacted by elected representatives. This 
contrasts sharply with the position in the Community, especially w'hen. as in 
Deufil, soft law is used to fill perceived gaps in the Community political 
process.
Conclusion
A trend in the Community towards the increasing use of soft law would be 
consistent with patterns of development in national administrations and inter-
80 See Martin Shapiro, (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1988), pp 127; 
see also Giandomenico Majone, 'Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies: Lessons from the 
American Experience', manuscript to be published.
8  ̂ See Robert Baldwin and Keith Hawkins, 'Discretionary Justice: Davis Reconsidered', 




























































































national organisations.82 The institutional and political context of the 
Community differs profoundly, however, from these other contexts. For this 
reason, it is important to assess carefully the use of soft law in the 
Community system. Of special importance are the interpretation of the con­
cept of subsidiarity as expressed in the Maastricht Treaty and its practical 
implications for the use of different types of legislative acts. Otherwise, the 
working practice of Community institutions may simply increase the contra­
dictions between efficiency, legality, and legitimacy.
82 A pertinent example is the 'Circulaire du 22 septembre 1988 relative à la définition des 
politiques de la France en matière européenne', 48, octobre-décembre 1988, pp 536-537. 
See generally Ganz, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987); Cliquennois, 'Que reste-t'il des 
directives? A propos du vingtième anniversaire de l’arrêt ’, (1992) 20 3; Chiti, 'Circolare 
I: Circolare amministrativa', Vol VI (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988); 
OECD Council Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter Pays Principle to 
Accidental Pollution, (1989) 28 ILM 1320; OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
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